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Casenote

FCC v. Fox: Has the Supreme Court
Sanctioned Political Influence in Agency
Decision-making?

I.

INTRODUCTION

Can agencies radically change policy simply because of a change in the
White House? The United States Supreme Court's latest decision in
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.1 suggests that agencies can do
exactly that. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), an
independent United States agency, regulates the content of U.S.
broadcasting stations. 2 In 2002 and 2003, the FCC and Fox clashed
when Fox aired two separate Billboard Music Awards (BMA) shows
during which BMA guests uttered isolated expletives.3 Prior to these
incidents, the FCC had never issued an indecency violation to a

1.

129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).

2. See id. at 1806. See generally Josh Martin, Comment, The FairnessDoctrine: The
BCS of American Politics,Annual Eleventh CircuitSurvey, 60 MERCER L. REV. 1393 (2009)
(discussing the FCC's use of the fairness doctrine).
3. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1808.
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broadcaster for airing only isolated expletives.4 Nevertheless, the FCC
issued a disciplinary order to Fox, finding such a violation.' Fox
petitioned for review by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, which vacated and remanded the order because the FCC
did not provide the fact-based "reasoned explanation" necessary for the
policy change to meet the applicable arbitrary and capricious standard
of review.' After granting a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court
refined the reasoned-explanation requirement, holding that the FCC
must only provide a subjective, reasoned explanation for its decision to
meet the arbitrary and capricious standard of review.7 Pursuant to this
refined reasoned-explanation test, the Court reversed the Second
Circuit's decision.'
In doing so, the Supreme Court relaxed the
requirement for when an agency changes policy, allowing increased
executive influence in agency policy choices. Consequently, an agency's
overall objective of serving the public interest may be hindered due to
increased political influence in agency decision-making.
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. JudicialAuthority to Review Agency Actions: The Administrative
ProcedureAct
Congress passed the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)9 in 1946,
granting courts the authority to review agency action."l Specifically,
the APA grants courts authority to "compel agency action"" when12
agencies fail to act and to '%old unlawful and set aside agency action"
when the reviewing court finds the agency's action to be "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law." 3 However, the APA does not expressly address how courts

4. See In re Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees Regarding Their Airing of
the "Golden Globe Awards" Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, 4980 (2004) (opinion and order).
5. Complaints Regarding Various Television Broads. Between Feb. 2, 2002 & Mar. 8,
2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 2664, 2691, 2694 (2006) (notices of apparent liability).
6. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 446-47, 462 (2d Cir. 2007).
7. See Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1810-11.
8. Id. at 1812, 1819.
9. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 5 U.S.C. (2006)). The APA was later recodified by Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378
(1966).
10. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006).
11. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2006).
12. Id. § 706(2).
13. Id. § 706(2)(A).
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should review agency actions that reverse prior policy choices. 4 Hence,
in 1983 the Supreme Court addressed this issue.15
B. Motor Vehicle ManufacturersAss'n of the United States, Inc. v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
The Supreme Court faced the issue of the appropriate judicial
standard of review for an agency's change in policy in the 1983 decision
of Motor Vehicle ManufacturersAss'n of the United States, Inc. v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 16 In that case, the Court
reviewed the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA)
radical policy change for passive restraint systems. 17 In 1977, during
the Carter Administration, Secretary of Transportation Brock Adams
implemented a regulation requiring automobile manufacturers to satisfy
a passive restraint requirement by installing either automatic seatbelts
or airbags into cars, and to complete the process by 1984. However, in
1981, shortly after President Reagan's inauguration, Secretary of
Transportation Andrew Lewis rescinded the passive restraint requirement. Consequently, State Farm filed a petition requesting the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to review
NHTSA's decision to rescind the passive restraint requirement. The
court of appeals rendered a judgment for State Farm, holding that the
NHTSA's change in policy was an arbitrary and capricious decision."
In response, the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association petitioned
for and was granted certiorari from the Supreme Court, which applied
the arbitrary and capricious standard. 9 In doing so, the Court held
that to meet the arbitrary and capricious standard, the NHTSA had to
provide a "reasoned analysis" for its change in policy.2" The Court
defined reasoned analysis as requiring the agency to show "a 'rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made.'"'" In
reviewing the NHTSA's reasons for changing its policy, the Court held
that the NHTSA had not provided a reasoned analysis to meet the

14. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1811 (2009).
15. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 40-41 (1983).
16. See 463 U.S. 29, 40-41 (1983).
17. See id. at 34.
18. Id. at 37-39.
19. Id. at 40-41.
20. Id. at 42.
21. Id. at 43 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168
(1962)).
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arbitrary and capricious standard of review, largely because the NHTSA
failed to address its own prior factual findings.2 2
Pursuant to the holding in State Farm, when an agency reverses a
policy choice, the agency has to provide a reasoned analysis to survive
arbitrary and capricious review.23 The Court's decision in State Farm
was also significant for another reason: the legal community largely
understood State Farm as holding that agencies should derive their
decisions based on their expertise and factual findings and not on
political reasons.'
C.

The FCC's Regulation of BroadcastingStations
Against this backdrop, the circumstances for FCC v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc.' began to emerge. Prior to 1960, the FCC's authority to
regulate broadcasting stations was limited because the Communications
Act of 193426 expressly forbade the FCC from engaging in censorship.27 In 1948 Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1464, 2 popularly known
as the "indecency ban."2 9 Entitled BroadcastingObscene Language, the
ban states in part: "Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane
language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title
.... ."o However, the FCC was not authorized to penalize broadcasters
under the indecency ban until Congress passed the Communications Act
Amendments of 1960."' Now, "[any person who is determined by the
Commission... to have ... violated any provision of section... 1464
of title 18 ... shall be liable to the United States for a forfeiture
penalty."3 2 With this amendment, Congress delegated the FCC
authority to sanction broadcasting stations
for airing obscene, indecent,
3
or profane language on the radio or TV.

22.
23.

See id. at 46-48.
See id. at 43.

24, See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposinga Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious
Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 6 (2009).

25. 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).
26. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-614 (2006).
27.

Id. § 326.

28. Pub. L. No. 80-772, § 1464, 62 Stat. 683, 769 (1948) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C.
29.
30.
31.

§ 1464 (2006)).
See Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1806.
18 U.S.C. § 1464.
See Pub. L. No. 86-752, § 7(a), 74 Stat. 889, 894 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.

§ 503).
32.
33.

47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(D).
See id.

20101

FCC V. FOX

647

In 1975 the FCC first exercised its authority granted in the Communications Act Amendments to sanction broadcasters for airing indecent
speech.3 4 The FCC's order in In re Citizen's Complaint Against Pacific
35
Foundation Station WBAI (FM), New York, N.Y (Pacifica Order)
arose from the broadcaster, Pacifica Foundation, airing George Carlin's
"Filthy Words" monologue on a radio broadcast." In "Filthy Words,"
Carlin intentionally repeated seven expletives as part of a satirical
comedy routine." This seminal Pacifica Order interpreted "indecent"
content as that which:
is intimately connected with the exposure of children to language that
describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary
community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory
activities and organs, at times of the day when there is a reasonable
risk that children may be in the audience. 8
Using this definition, the FCC found that Pacifica's broadcast of "Filthy
Words" was actionably indecent.39 The FCC had not included repetition in its indecency definition 0 but noted that the monologue's use of
"language with the words repeated over and over" supported its
indecency finding. 4 Pacifica appealed the FCC's order to the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and the
court of appeals overturned the order.4
After the court of appeals reversed the FCC's indecency ruling, the
FCC petitioned for certiorari from the Supreme Court.43 In reviewing
the FCC's interpretation of indecency, as the term appeared in the
statutory indecency ban, the Court upheld the FCC's definition.44
However, in upholding the FCC's definition, the Court refined the
definition to require the repetitive use of words.4 5 While repetition was
a factor that the FCC had considered in the Pacifica Order,46 the FCC

34. See In re Citizen's Complaint Against Pac. Found. Station WBAI (FM), New York,
N.Y. (PacificaOrder), 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 99 (1975) (declaratory order).
35. 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975) (declaratory order).
36. Id. at 95.
37. See id. at 100.
38. Id. at 98.
39. Id. at 99.
40. See id. at 98.
41. Id. at 99.
42. Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 10-11 (D.C. Cir. 1977), reu'd, 438 U.S. 726
(1978).
43. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 733-34 (1978).
44. Id. at 739, 741.
45. Id. at 739.
46. See 56 F.C.C.2d at 99.
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had not included repetition in its indecency definition.4 7 Yet the
Supreme Court found the repetition factor important enough to be
included in the indecency definition partly because repetition indicates
that the speaker deliberately intended the language to be offensive. 48
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell clarified that the Court's
holding did "not speak to cases involving the isolated use of a potentially
offensive word."49 Thus, the Court refined the definition of indecency
in the indecency ban statute to require the repetition of expletives.50
In 2001, after receiving numerous requests from broadcasters for
clarification of their restrictions under the indecency ban, the FCC
issued Industry Guidanceon the Commission's Case Law Interpreting18
U.S.C. § 1464 & Enforcement Policies Regarding Broadcast Indecency
(Industry Guidance Statement).51 This statement included "whether the
material dwells on or repeatsat length descriptions of sexual or excretory
organs or activities" 52 as one of three principle factors that the FCC
balances in determining whether language is patently offensive and,
therefore, indecent.5 3 Expanding on the repetition factor, the FCC
identified numerous prior FCC decisions in which "[riepetition of and
persistent focus on sexual or excretory material [had] consistently [been]
factors that exacerbate[d] the potential offensiveness of broadcasts.' 54
Further, the FCC stated that "[in contrast, where sexual or excretory
references have been made once or have been passing or fleeting in
nature, this characteristic has tended to weigh against a finding of
indecency."' The FCC also provided past instances when this fleeting
nature weighed against a finding of indecency. For example, in L.M.
Communications of South Carolina, Inc.,56 the FCC found that the
language "[tihe hell I did, I drove mother-fucker" was not indecent
because "the 'broadcast contained only a fleeting and isolated utterance

47. See id. at 98.
48. See Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 757 (Powell, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 760-61 (emphasis added).
50. See In re Pacifica Foundation, Inc., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698,2699 (1987) (opinion and order)
("If a complaint focuses solely on the use of expletives, we believe that under the legal
standards set forth in Pacifica, deliberate and repetitive use in a patently offensive manner
is a requisite to a finding of indecency.").
51. 16 F.C.C.R. 7999 (2001) (policy statement).
52. Id. at 8003.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 8008 (emphasis added).
55. Id.
56. 7 F.C.C.R. 1595 (1992) (letter).
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which, within the context of live and spontaneous programming, [did]
not warrant a Commission sanction.' 5 7
The Industry Guidance Statement also included some examples of
when fleeting expletives were actionably indecent because their patent
offensiveness outweighed their fleeting nature.5 " These examples
included "broadcasting references to sexual activities with children and
airing material that, although fleeting, is graphic or explicit."59 Thus,
in the Industry Guidance Statement, the FCC proclaimed that the nonrepetitive use of language, absent an overwhelming, patently offensive
quality, weighs heavily againstan indecency finding under the indecency
ban.'
D. Change in Policy: The Golden Globes Order
While clear and helpful in theory, the FCC's indecency clarification
was not in effect for long. In 2004 the FCC issued an order that
drastically changed FCC precedent and served as the basis for the
dispute in Fox."' In In re Complaints Against Various Broadcast
Licensees Regarding TheirAiring of the "Golden Globe Awards"Program
62 the FCC
(Golden Globes Order),
brought a disciplinary action against
various broadcasters that aired a segment of the Golden Globe Awards
show during which U2 lead singer, Bono, exclaimed ' "63
"either 'this is
really, really fucking brilliant,' or 'this is fucking great.
In the Golden Globes Order, the FCC found for the first time that a
non-repetitive expletive was indecent.6 The FCC began its order by
setting forth the indecency definition "as language that, in context,
depicts or describes sexual or excretory activities or organs in terms
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards
for the broadcast medium."65 While the FCC mentioned that repetition
57. Industry Guidance Statement, 16 F.C.C.R. at 8008 (quoting L.M. Commc'ns ofS.C.,
Inc., 7 F.C.C.R. at 1595); see also In re Applications of Lincoln Dellar for Renewal of the

Licenses of Stations KPRL(AM) & KDDB(FM) Paso Robles, Cal., 8 F.C.C.R. 2582, 2585
(1993) (opinion and order) (deciding that "the news announcer's use of a single expletive
[did not] ... warrant further Commission consideration in light of the isolated and

accidental nature of the broadcast").
58.

See Industry Guidance Statement, 16 F.C.C.R. at 8009.

59.

Id.

60. See id. at 8008-09.
61. In re Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the
"Golden Globe Awards" Program (Golden Globes Order), 19 F.C.C.R. 4975 (2004) (opinion
and order).
62. 19 F.C.C.R. 4975 (2004) (opinion and order).
63. Id. at 4975-76, 4983 n.4.
64. Id. at 4980.
65. Id. at 4977.
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was a factor considered in determining whether material was indecent,
the FCC failed to thoroughly analyze this factor." Rather, ignoring the
balancing test set out in the Industry Guidance Statement, the FCC
explained that it could find indecency from non-repetitive words that are
patently offensive.67 The FCC applied the new standard and found
Bono's use of the "F-Word" to be patently offensive," partly because the
word was inherently sexual in nature.69 Thus, the FCC found Bono's
language indecent in accordance with the indecency ban despite its
fleeting use. °
The FCC noted that it had changed policy: "While prior Commission
and staff action have indicated that isolated or fleeting broadcasts of the
'F-Word' such as that here are not indecent or would not be acted upon,
consistent with our decision today we conclude that any such interpretation is no longer good law."71 Finally, the FCC concluded by stating
that broadcasters were on "clear notice" that fleeting expletives could be
actionably indecent.72
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND FOR FCC v. Fox
Unfortunately, Fox did not receive the notice because the "clear notice"
the FCC intended in the 2004 Golden Globes Order was issued after Fox
73
aired the broadcasts at issue in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.
The case arose out of Fox's airing of two BMA live broadcasts. The first
broadcast occurred in 2002 when famed musician, Cher, upon winning
the Artist Achievement Award, proclaimed, "I've also had critics for the
last 40 years saying that I was on my way out every year. Right. So
fuck 'em." In like fashion and only one year later, stars of MTV's reality
show The Simple Life, Paris Hilton and Nicole Richie, presented an
award at the 2003 BMA. Hilton began the speech by telling Nicole to
"watch the bad language." In response, Richie said, "Why do they even
call it The Simple Life? Have you ever tried
to get cow shit out of a
74
Prada purse? It's not so fucking simple."

66. See id. at 4978-80.
67. Id. at 4980.
68. Id. at 4982.
69. See id. at 4978.
70. See id. at 4982.
71. Id. at 4980.
72. Id. at 4982.
73. See 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009); In re Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees
Regarding Their Airing of the "Golden Globe Awards" Program (Golden Globes Order), 19
F.C.C.R. 4975 (2004) (opinion and order).
74. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1808 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Because of these two incidents, the FCC received complaints from the
public concerning Fox's airing of the 2002 and 2003 BMA broadcasts. In
2006, after reviewing these complaints, the FCC issued an order to Fox,
informing the broadcaster that its airing of both Cher's expletive in 2002
and Nicole Richie's expletives in 2003 was actionably indecent." In
that order, entitled In re Complaints Regarding Various Television
76
BroadcastsBetween February2, 2002 & March 8, 2005 (InitialOrder),
the FCC did not sanction Fox because Fox had insufficient notice that
isolated expletives could be indecent. 77 In response, several broadcasters sent complaints to the FCC because they were not afforded an
opportunity to be heard before the FCC made its decision.78
Subsequent to the FCC's review of the broadcasters' complaints, the
FCC vacated the Initial Order in its entirety and replaced it with a new
order, In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts
79
In the
Between February 2, 2002 & March 8, 2005 (Remand Order).
Remand Order, the FCC analyzed Cher's and Richie's vulgar language
at the respective BMA shows.8 ° In doing so, the FCC used the same
1
the
indecency definition that it had used in the Golden Globes Order,"
order in which the FCC found Bono's isolated expletive indecent.8"
Thus, the FCC had to determine whether Cher's and Richie's isolated
expletives were "material that, in context, depict[] or describe[] sexual
or excretory activities or organs in terms patently offensive as measured
by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium."'
In addressing the nonrepetitive nature of both the statements, the FCC
referenced the Golden Globes Order as precedent, explaining that the
nonrepetitive use of language that is patently offensive may be
indecent." Applying this standard, the FCC found that both Cher and
Richie's language was patently offensive and, thus, indecent. 85

75. Id.
76. 21 F.C.C.R. 2664 (2006) (notices of apparent liability).
77. Id. at 2692, 2695. Despite the "clear notice" in the Golden Globes Order, 19
F.C.C.R. at 4982, the FCC decided that the notice was insufficient to sanction Fox. Initial
Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 2692, 2695.
78. In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broads. Between Feb. 2, 2002 &
Mar. 8, 2005 (Remand Order), 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13302 (2006) (order).
79. 21 F.C.C.R. 13299 (2006) (order).
80. See id. at 13299-300.
81. Compare id. at 13303 (defining indecency), with Golden Globes Order, 19 F.C.C.R.
at 4977 (same).
82. See supra text accompanying notes 61-69.
83. Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 13303.
84. Id. at 13308, 13325.

85. Id.
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Significantly, the Remand Order changed yet another aspect of the
FCC's indecency policy. Prior to the Remand Order, the FCC distinguished between expletives that were "descriptions or depictions of
sexual or excretory functions" and other expletives.8" Isolated expletives that described sexual or excretory functions were generally
considered patently offensive, weighing toward an indecency finding. 7
In contrast, other types of expletives were never considered to be
patently offensive, so the FCC never found the isolated use of these plain
expletives to be indecent." Noting that this "strict dichotomy" was
artificial and made no sense because "an expletive's power to offend
derives from its sexual or excretory meaning,"89 the FCC demolished
this distinction with respect to the "F-Word" and the "S-Word.9'
Because the FCC had previously held that a word's sexual or excretory
depictions weighed heavily toward a finding of patent offensiveness,9 1
the FCC defining the "F-Word" and "S-Word" as always depictions of
sexual or excretory functions meant that these words always weighed
In essence, the FCC had
toward finding patent offensiveness.92
completely reversed course by directing that the majority of isolated
usages of these words were actionably indecent.93
After the Remand Order, Fox petitioned for and received review of the
FCC's decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit." Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.,' the court of appeals required the FCC to
provide a fact-based, reasoned explanation for the change in policy to
meet the arbitrary and capricious standard.' Specifically, the court of
appeals held that agencies must clarify "why the original reasons for
adopting the [displaced] rule or policy are no longer dispositive" and
"why the new rule effectuates the statute as well as or better than the
old rule."9 7 Under these requirements, the court of appeals held that

86.

Id. at 13308 (internal quotation marks omitted).

87. Id.
88. Id.
89.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

90. See id.
91.

See Golden Globes Order, 19 F.C.C.R. at 4978.

92. Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 13308.
93.

See id.

94. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 446 (2d Cir. 2007).
95. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
96. See Fox, 489 F.3d at 456-57.
97. Id. (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting N.Y. Council, Ass'n
of Civilian Technicians v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 757 F.2d 502, 508 (2d Cir. 1985)).
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the FCC failed to provide a reasoned explanation to justify changing
policy from consistently viewing isolated fleeting expletives as outside
the indecency scope to finding such isolated usages indecent.9" Thus,
the FCC's change was found to be arbitrary and capricious.'
Subsequently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the
appropriate meaning of arbitrary and capricious when an agency
changes policy. Specifically, the Court had to determine whether the
FCC properly justified its policy change to hold isolated expletives
indecent."°
IV.
A.

COURT'S REASONING

The Majority

The majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia and joined by Justices
Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, held that the FCC was justified
in changing its policy. 01 First, the majority examined whether the
Second Circuit properly articulated an agency's requirement to meet the
arbitrary and capricious standard when an agency changes course. 02
The Court held that the Second Circuit wrongly heightened this
requirement, finding no basis for courts to utilize a more searching
requirement when an agency changes policy than when an agency
initially acts. 3 The Court clarified that the APA "makes no distinction ... between initial agency action and subsequent agency action
The Court also examined the
undoing or revising that action."' °
of
Motor
Vehicle ManufacturersAss'n of
Second Circuit's interpretation
Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.,10 5
State
Farm
the United States v.
the primary Supreme Court decision that the Second Circuit determined
required a heightened requirement for when an agency changes
course.X10
In reviewing the lower court's interpretation of State Farm, the Court
concluded that the court of appeals wrongly interpreted the language in
State Farm that the standard invoked when an agency changes course
is "'a reasoned analysis for the [agency's] change beyond that which may

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 462.
Id. at 447.
See Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1805.
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1812 (2009).
Id. at 1810.
Id.
Id. at 1811.
463 U.S. 29 (1983).
See Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1810-11.
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10 7 The
be required when an agency does not act in the first instance.'"
court of appeals interpreted that language to mean that the agency's
burden should be greater than that required to meet the arbitrary and
s
capricious standard when the agency initially acts."~ The Court noted
that compelling agency action because of an agency's failure to act is not
as high of a standard as ""hold[ing] unlawful and set[ting] aside agency
action, findings, and conclusions found to be ...arbitrary [or] capricious.'""° Thus, the Court in State Farm was, in actuality, pronouncing that an agency's burden for explaining changes in course to meet the
arbitrary and capricious standard was the same as that for initial
agency action."0 Finally, the Court pronounced that an agency's
requirement to explain a change in course was no stricter than the
requirement for explaining initial decisions."'
Next, the majority explained that for an agency to meet the arbitrary
and capricious standard when an agency changes policy, the agency
2 This
must only provide a "reasoned explanation" for its action."
reasoned explanation requires the agency to display awareness that it
is changing its position and "show that there are good reasons for the
new policy."" 3 However, the agency "need not demonstrate to a court's
satisfaction that the reasons for the new policy are better than the
reasons for the old one."" 4 Rather, "it suffices that the new policy is
permissible under the statute, that there are good reasons for it, and
that the agency believes it to be better, which the conscious change of
course adequately indicates."" 5 Essentially, the court had changed the
requirement for when an agency changes course from an objective, factbased explanation to a subjective, less stringent showing.
The Court continued, explaining that this standard does not mean that
an agency must "always provide a more detailed justification than what
6
would suffice for a new policy created on a blank slate."" However,
sometimes the agency must provide a more detailed justification, for
example, if "its new policy rests upon factual findings that contradict
those which underlay its prior policy," or if the agency's "prior policy has

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

1810 (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42).
1810-11.
1811 (fourth alteration in original) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006)).
1810-11.
1811.
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engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account."'1 Thus, a detailed justification would only be required when
the agency acted in a way that disregarded facts or circumstances that
were the basis for the prior policy.n 8
Finally, applying the new requirement to the indecency findings at
issue, the majority held that the FCC provided a sufficient reasonable
explanation for its change in policy." 9 Specifically, the majority held
that the FCC provided sufficient awareness of its change in policy,
explaining that "[tihere is no doubt that the Commission knew it was
making a change. That is why it declined to assess penalties ....
Further, the majority held that the FCC's decision to no longer
distinguish between literal and nonliteral meanings of offensive
expletives and instead to find all uses of certain offensive words indecent
was "entirely rational."" 1 Likewise, the Court held that the FCC's
change to finding nonrepetitive uses of expletives actionably indecent
was reasonable. 122 Thus, under the Court's new subjective, reasonable
explanation-standard, the FCC's change in policy was acceptable
regardless of whether the change was based on political reasons.
B. The Concurrences
Justices Thomas and Kennedy concurred separately.'23 Justice
Kennedy agreed with the majority that the Second Circuit's standard
was inappropriate for judicial review of the FCC's change in course at
issue. 1"4 Justice Kennedy explained, "The question whether a change
in policy requires an agency to provide a more-reasoned explanation
than when the original policy was first announced is not susceptible...
to an answer that applies in all cases." 125 However, Justice Kennedy

emphasized that while the standard used in the present case was
appropriate, future courts need to keep in mind that "an agency's
decision to change course may be arbitrary and capricious if the agency
sets a new course that reverses an earlier determination but does not

117.

Id.

118. Id.
119. Id. at 1812.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 1813.

123. Justice Thomas's concurrence is excluded from this Note because the concurrence
addresses First Amendment concerns irrelevant to this Note. See id. at 1819-22 (Thomas,
J., concurring).
124. See id. at 1822-24 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
125. Id. at 1822-23.
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provide a reasoned explanation for doing SO." 126 In other words, when
applicable, an agency must articulate why "'it now reject[s] the
considerations that led it to adopt that initial policy.'' 127 While Justice
Kennedy conceded that the facts of the specific case were appropriate for
the standard Justice Scalia presented, Justice Kennedy believed that the
standard would produce an unjust result if implemented in cases in
2
which the facts necessitated a more specific standard of review.' 8
Further, Justice Kennedy noted that "[i]f agencies were permitted
unbridled discretion, their actions might violate important constitutional
1 29
principles of separation of powers and checks and balances."
C. The Dissents
There were three separate dissents by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Breyer. 3 ' Justice Stevens stated that a sufficient explanation for an
administration's policy change is essential to ensure that the agency is
following legislative intent rather than political will.'31
Justice
Stevens explained that while agencies are traditionally thought to be
controlled by both the executive and the legislative branches, in order to
protect agencies from political partisan influence, Congress has
substantially more control. 3 2 Hence, Congress, rather than the
executive branch, is the body that delegates authority to agencies
through statutes. 3 3 Justice Stevens explained, "[W]hen Congress
grants rulemaking and adjudicative authority to an expert agency
composed of commissioners selected through a bipartisan procedure and
appointed for fixed terms, it substantially insulates the agency from
executive control."'3 4 However, Justice Stevens explained that agencies must follow the intent of the legislature to remain constitutionally
legitimate and free from partisan political influence. 3 ' Thus, courts
should require a substantial justification for agencies changing policy to
ensure that agencies follow legislative intent.3 6

126. Id. at 1822.
127. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1831 (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
128. Id. at 1824.
129. Id. at 1823.
130. Justice Ginsburg's dissent is excluded from this Note because the dissent discusses
First Amendment concerns irrelevant to this Note. See id. at 1828-29 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
131. See id. at 1825-26 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132. See id. at 1825.
133. See id. at 1825-26.
134. Id. at 1825.
135. See id. at 1825-26.
136. See id. at 1826.
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Justice Breyer's dissent, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg, was the only dissent joined by other Justices.' 7 To begin,
Justice Breyer emphasized the broad authority granted to independent
agencies.1 3 Independent agencies are part of the executive branch
but, unlike executive agencies, are not part of the federal executive
departments.'39 Justice Breyer explained that agency law "does not
permit [independent agencies] to make policy choices for purely political
reasons nor to rest them primarily upon unexplained policy preferences."140 Justice Breyer continued, stating that independent agencies
like the FCC are purposefully designed to be free from political
oversight.'
This design "helps to secure important governmental
objectives, such as ... maintaining broadcast regulation that does not
bend too readily before the political winds."'42 However, Justice
Breyer explained that the commissioners of independent agencies are not
voted into office,' 43 and this unaccountability to the people "makes it
all the more important that courts review [agency] decisionmaking to
assure compliance with applicable provisions of the law-including law
requiring that major policy decisions be based upon articulable
144
reasons."
Justice Breyer believed that an agency's explanation for its change
4
should be much more detailed than the majority had required. 1
However, Justice Breyer clarified that this detailed analysis would not
be a heightened standard of review.146 The same arbitrary and
capricious standard of review would be used, but the Court would focus
on the change at issue. 147 Justice Breyer explained his standard:
[Tihe agency must explain why it has come to the conclusion that it
should now change direction. Why does it now reject the considerations that led it to adopt that initial policy? What has changed in the
world that offers justification for the change? What
14 other good reasons
are there for departing from the earlier policy?

137. See id. at 1824; id. at 1828 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 1829 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
138. Id. at 1829 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
139. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 71-72 (9th ed. 2009).

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1829.
Id.
Id. at 1829-30.
Id. at 1829.
Id. at 1830.
See id. at 1831.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Justice Breyer then explained the negative implications of the majority's
less detailed, less change-focused holding.149 Specifically, he asserted
that the majority's holding will allow agencies to change policies based
on "nothing more than political considerations or ... personal
whim."'5 ° Thus, the political influence that agencies are designed to
avoid will nevertheless become a pertinent part of the agency decisionmaking process.15 '
V. IMPLICATIONS OF FCC v. Fox
The FCC was established because Congress was concerned that
broadcast regulation "'should be as free from political influence or
arbitrary control as possible.'"' 52 Yet the Supreme Court's new relaxed
standard for reviewing agency changes may serve to hinder this overall
congressional objective." 3 Scholars have already expressed concern
that FCC v. Fox"5 "seems to make it easier for agencies to change
their policies due to changes in the political landscape."'55
This
concern is easy to understand, especially because the Court's new
requirement includes, as a factor weighing toward an acceptable
explanation, an agency's belief that a change was better.5 ' As Justice
Breyer explained, an agency's belief can be based on raw political
ideology.'57 Thus, judicial review based on the subjective beliefs of
agencies will allow political-based agency decisions to stand. Granted,
an agency's belief that its change is better is not the only requirement
for an agency policy change to pass arbitrary and capricious review.158
However, at best, including the "belief" requirement does little to help
courts make a decision. At worst, the belief requirement may sway
courts to allow arbitrary political change.
The Court's decision in Fox, by allowing more political influence in
agencies, is potentially detrimental because politically influenced agency

149. Id. at 1832.
150. Id.
151. See id.

152. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1825 (2009) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting S. Rep. No. 69-772, at 2 (1926)).

153. See id. at 1825-26.
154. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).
155. Watts, supra note 24, at 22; see also Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing 'Political"
Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript
at 13), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1470850.

156. See Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1811.
157. Id. at 1832 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
158. See id. at 1811 (majority opinion) (noting that a court must also decide that there
are good reasons for the policy and that the policy is permissible under the statute).
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decisions may be harmful to the public interest. Currently, legal
scholars have articulated two opposing theories concerning the appropriate level of political influence on agencies. Those in favor of the
president-centered theory argue that presidential influence "is necessary
to the legitimacy of executive branch agencies because it represents a
mechanism of electoral accountability."159 The opposing view-namely,
that agency decisions are best made through careful considerations of
agency expertise and that political influence interferes with an agency's
ability to advance the public interest'6--is the better position for
several reasons.
First, the Federal government created each agency to address specific
public interest concerns that affect the everyday population. For
example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was created "to
protect human health and to safeguard the natural environment ...
upon which life depends." 161 Agencies employ a specialized staff that
is exclusively trained with expertise in its respective area, and agency
employees make decisions in the public interest based on their expertise.
Conversely, the President might not have the time or energy to resolve
agency issues with the care needed to advance the public interest.
Because an agency is the governmental entity with the resources and
responsibility to discover publicly beneficial information, the agency-not
the President-should be the ultimate decision maker. If the President
directs an agency based on his or her political will, and this will is
contrary to the agency's findings, the agency's ultimate decision may not
be in the public interest. Before the Supreme Court's decision in Fox,
the public at least had some judicial recourse for this kind of agency
decision-making. However, the Court's decision in Fox has made it
acceptable for agencies to disregard their expert factual findings and
change their policies based on pure political reasons. Thus, the public
interest is no longer adequately protected from agencies' arbitrary
political decision-making.
Second, while the concern that agencies need some kind of presidential
involvement to be electorally accountable is valid, this electoral
accountability may be achieved without presidential politics infiltrating
agency decision-making. Several scholars agree that presidential
interference with agency decision-making does not legitimize agency

159. Mendelson, supra note 155 (manuscript at 3).
160. See id.; Peter L. Strauss, Overseer or "The Decider"? The Presidentin Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 756-57 (2007).
161. Environmental Protection Agency, Our Mission and What We Do, httpJ/www.
epa.gov/epahome/whatwedo.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2010).
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action. 162 One scholar distinguishes presidential oversight of agencies
from presidential decision-making, arguing that the former is a less
intrusive way to secure electoral accountability."6 Further, Congress
delegated power to agencies, not the President; when the President acts
as the decision maker in agencies, he or she undermines Congress's
delegation of agency power, and in turn, intrudes on the separation of
powers.' 4 Arguing that presidential decision-making in agencies is
necessary to hold agencies electorally accountable should not distract
from the potential harm that a president's political influence on agencies
may have on the public interest. Therefore, the Court's decision in Fox
remains potentially harmful to the public interest even when considering
the electoral accountability argument for accepting executive influence
in agencies.
Third, relying on agency expertise, as opposed to political direction, is
the best approach for both independent and executive agencies. One
pertinent consideration the Court failed to take into account in Fox is
the difference between independent and executive agencies. Executive
agencies, or federal agencies, are part of federal executive departments
headed by Cabinet secretaries. 5 Independent agencies, while still
part of the executive branch, are not part of an executive department
under the direct control of the President.' Justice Scalia explained,
"The Administrative Procedure Act ... makes no distinction between
independent and other agencies ... in the standards for reviewing
agency action."'67 Thus, the Court's relaxed standard in Fox for
reviewing agency policy changes will apply to executive and independent
agencies alike.'6 8 Although independent agencies are "sheltered ...
from the President, [as] it has often been observed [from] their freedom
from presidential oversight,"6 9 executive agencies are wholly controlled by the President. Thus, these executive agencies are more likely

162. See Robert V. Percival, PresidentialManagement of the AdministrativeState: The
Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963, 1009-10 (2001) (arguing that presidents
deciding agency policy actually hinders the accountability of both the agency and the
executive); Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-AdministrativeImpulse,
103 MICH. L. REv. 2073, 2081-83 (2005); see also Strauss, supra note 160, at 704-05
(distinguishing presidential oversight of agencies from presidential decision-making and
proposing that the former is all that is needed for electoral accountability).
163. Strauss, supra note 160, at 704-05.
164. See id. at 697-98.
165. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 139, at 71.
166. Id. at 71-72.
167. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1817.
168. See id.
169. Id. at 1815.
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to alternate their policies with each change in administration, and under
the Court's new standard, these politically based changes will likely be
permitted. Moreover, even though independent agencies have some
safeguards, they too are subject to presidential influence. For example,
in the recent Supreme Court decision, Massachusetts v. EPA,'7" the
Court held that the EPA, an independent agency, did not provide a
reasoned explanation for its decision to not establish greenhouse gas
standards for motor vehicles, which was based on avoiding interference
with President Bush's foreign policy initiatives.' 7 ' Thus, the Court's
new standard affects both types of agencies, even if the standard may
affect executive agencies more than independent agencies.
Finally, relying on agency expertise provides a reliable safeguard
against political influence compared to the faulty "detailed justification"
solution the court articulated. While Justice Scalia announced a
"detailed justification" requirement for when agency policy contradicts
prior factual findings,'72 this detailed justification is insufficient to
prevent all harmful political decision-making. The requirement is
insufficient because, for a court to be able to apply a "detailed justification" standard of review, the new policy must contradict prior factual
findings-a strict test that will rarely be met. For instance, many times
the President's political influence on agencies will go against some
factual findings but not all factual findings.' 7 ' Also, the President's
influence may be consistent with an agency's factual findings but against
the public interest. In situations such as these, political influence will
pass muster because the influence does not contradict the agency's prior
factual findings. Moreover, even if an agency's decision is found to
completely contradict prior factual findings and to warrant a detailed
justification, Justice Scalia failed to articulate what a detailed justification entails.'74 Without specific guidelines, an agency may have a
better chance of a court upholding its decisions. Thus, even if a detailed
justification is required, it does not necessarily follow that courts will set
aside an agency's politically influenced decision.

170.
171.

549 U.S. 497 (2007).
See id. at 533-34.

172. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1811.
173.

See, e.g., Huntington Hosp. v. Thompson, 319 F.3d 74, 79-80 (2d Cir. 2003)

(holding that the agency did not provide a reasoned justification for altering its regulations
when only one of numerous prior factual findings was contradicted).

174. See Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1811.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the Court's decision in FCC v. Fox 175 will likely have
public interest consequences. When a court reviews an agency's policy
change, the subjective "reasoned explanation" requirement to meet
arbitrary and capricious review-an abrupt downgrade from State
Farm's fact-based "reasoned explanation" requirement-allows the
agency to retreat from expert factual findings and make decisions based
on political pressure. Thus, partisan presidential politics may now
determine the public interest instead of expert research. An agency's
unique position and power allow it to practically and beneficially serve
the public. Yet when agencies abuse this power, they may compromise
the public interest. Courts have the responsibility to ensure that the
latter does not occur, and thus, courts should cautiously review an
agency decision. In setting a standard that hinders courts from taking
a cautious approach when reviewing agency policy changes, the Court
has failed to meet this responsibility. The Court will, hopefully, receive
an opportunity to correct this shortcoming in the near future.
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